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FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT
IN ALASKA AND THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT OF 1965
CHRISTOPHER R. MURRAY*
Alaska and forty-seven other states have provisions that limit the
voting rights of felons. In many of these states, including Alaska,
minority groups are disproprtionately affected by these felon
disenfranchisement laws. This Note examines the validity of these
laws generally, and Alaska’s laws in particular, under the the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.

I. INTRODUCTION
1
Alaska limits the voting rights of felons. Forty-seven other
2
states have similar policies. And, as in many of these other states,
3
racial minorities in Alaska are disproportionately affected.
Indeed, the state’s largest minority group, Alaska Natives, is
overrepresented in the state’s prison population, indicating a
4
greater likelihood of disenfranchisement. Because the right to
vote is central to democratic government, any law that tends more
frequently to disenfranchise racial minorities should be cause for
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1. ALASKA CONST. art. V, § 2 (“No person may vote who has been convicted
of a felony involving moral turpitude unless his civil rights have been restored.”).
2. JAMIE FELLNER & MARC MAUER, LOSING THE VOTE: THE IMPACT OF
FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES pt. IV (1998),
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports98/vote.
3. Id. pt. III.
4. Alaska Natives constituted approximately sixteen percent of Alaska’s
general population as of 2000, United States Census, available at
http://factfinder.census.gov (under “get a Fact Sheet for your community” enter
“Alaska” into “state” field; then follow “2000” link) [hereinafter U.S. Census], but
represent over thirty-seven percent of the state’s prison population, ALASKA
DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, 2003 OFFENDER PROFILE 11 (2004), available at
http://www.correct.state.ak.us/corrections/admin/docs/profile2003.pdf [hereinafter
ALASKA OFFENDER PROFILE].
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alarm. Nevertheless, because Alaska’s felon disenfranchisement
laws appear not to have been enacted with a discriminatory
5
purpose, they likely do not violate the Federal Constitution.
The laws may, however, run afoul of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 (“VRA”), which was amended in 1982 to invalidate state
6
voting qualifications that have a racially disproportionate impact.
Recent litigation has challenged state felon disenfranchisement
7
Though none of these challenges have
laws on this basis.
succeeded—and two circuits have held that the VRA simply does
8
not apply to felon disenfranchisement —the Ninth Circuit recently
allowed a VRA challenge to the State of Washington’s felon
9
disenfranchisement provision.
To date, no case has been brought challenging felon
disenfranchisement in Alaska. This Note is directed to that
possibility. Part II puts Alaska’s felon disenfranchisement laws
into national context and explains why, even if they produce a
racially discriminatory impact, they are likely not unconstitutional.
Next, Part III assesses the circuit split over whether the VRA
applies to felon disenfranchisement laws and the Ninth Circuit’s
decision that it does. Lastly, Part IV outlines the Ninth Circuit law
that would govern a VRA challenge to Alaska’s felon
disenfranchisement laws in light of a recent similar challenge in
Washington.
II. ALASKA’S FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS
A. National Context
Disenfranchisement of criminals is neither a unique nor a
recent phenomenon. The United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia
all, to some degree, have voting qualifications based on criminal
10
status. The ancient Greeks and Romans disenfranchised those
guilty of infamous crimes, and voting was among a range of civil

5. See discussion infra Part II.C.
6. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43–44 (1986).
7. See, e.g., Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2006); Johnson v.
Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005).
8. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 310; Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1234.
9. Farrakhan v. Washington (Farrakhan I), 338 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir.
2003).
10. Debra Parkes, Ballot Boxes Behind Bars: Toward the Repeal of Prisoner
Disenfranchisement Laws, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 71, 73 (2003).
Restrictions abroad, however, tend to be more mild than those found in the
United States. Id.
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rights denied in post-Renaissance Europe on the theory that
criminals suffer a “civil death.”11
Today in the United States, disenfranchisement is among
many collateral consequences of felony conviction such as
exclusion from certain professions and restrictions on carrying a
12
concealed weapon. In a frequently quoted opinion, Judge Henry
Friendly justified the practice on a Lockean social-contract theory
by arguing that criminals, in breaking societal rules, waive their
13
Other courts have
rights to participate in the rule-making.
expressed an interest in preserving the “purity of the ballot box”
from infection by those who by their acts have proven themselves
14
morally unfit.
15
Nevertheless, the practice is not without critics. With respect
to traditional justifications for criminal sanction—rehabilitation,
retribution, and deterrence—felon disenfranchisement seems to
fall short given the counter-productivity of keeping criminals from
participating in civil society, the disproportionate application of, in
some cases, lifetime disenfranchisement to a broad range of crimes,
and the limited deterrent effect of the threat of
16
disenfranchisement. Abroad, felon disenfranchisement laws have
17
been judicially rejected on political and human-rights grounds.

11. Id. at 73–74; Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological Paradox of
Criminal Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045,
1059–60 (2002).
12. See Scott M. Bennett, Note, Giving Ex-Felons the Right to Vote, 6 CAL.
CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2004) (outlining the most common normative arguments for and
against felon disenfranchisement).
13. Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451–52 (2d Cir. 1967) (Friendly,
J.) (“A contention that the equal protection clause requires New York to allow
convicted mafiosi to vote for district attorneys or judges would not only be
without merit but as obviously so as anything can be.”).
14. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 345 (1972) (quoting TENN. CONST. art.
IV, § 1).
15. See, e.g., Alec. C. Ewald, An “Agenda for Demolition”: The Fallacy and
the Danger of the “Subversive Voting” Argument for Felony Disenfranchisement,
36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 109 (2004).
16. See Bennett, supra note 12, ¶¶ 29–45.
17. The Canadian Supreme Court recently struck down a law preventing
prisoners from voting. Suavé v. Canada, [2002] S.C.R. 519. The European Court
of Human Rights held that a United Kingdom felon disenfranchisement law
violated the human rights of convicts. Hirst v. United Kingdom (No 2), 38 Eur.
Ct. H.R. 40 (2005). For a detailed analysis of the Canadian decision, see Parkes,
supra note 10, at 79–85. For an analysis of the ECHR decision as well as an
assessment of a “growing international consensus,” see Robin L. Nunn, Comment,
Lock Them Up and Throw Away the Vote, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 763, 778–79 (2005).
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The modern practice of felon disenfranchisement in the
United States is primarily a function of state law.18 Forty-eight
states and the District of Columbia have some form of felon
disenfranchisement, generally consisting of constitutional
19
Felon disenfranchisement
provisions buttressed by statute.
expanded after the nation’s founding, with most such laws enacted
20
At the time the
during the mid- to late-nineteenth century.
Reconstruction Amendments were enacted, twenty-nine of the
21
thirty-six states had some form of felon disenfranchisement.
Modern practice varies by state. At the extreme, at least three
22
states impose lifetime voting bans on felons. These jurisdictions
go beyond the historical scope of felon disenfranchisement laws in
the United States and the contemporary practice in other states
23
and internationally. The reach of these laws is striking—lifetime
disenfranchisement may even be predicated upon crimes such as
24
jaywalking, vagrancy, or breaking a water pipe.
Alaska’s felon disenfranchisement law is not as severe. The
state constitution provides that “[n]o person may vote who has

18. Although the United States Constitution generally grants states the
authority to establish voter qualifications, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1, that
authority is constrained, not only by other express constitutional provisions, e.g.,
U.S. CONST. amend. XV (right to vote cannot be denied on account of race); U.S.
CONST. amend. XIX (gender); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (poll taxes), but also by
strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause as interfering with the
fundamental right of voting, see Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621
(1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
19. See FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 2, pt. II (surveying severity of felon
disenfranchisement laws by state). For a state-by-state summary of state felon
disenfranchisement laws, see SUSAN M. KUZMA, U.S DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF
THE PARDON ATTORNEY (DOJ/OPA), CIVIL DISABILITIES OF CONVICTED FELONS:
A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (1996), http://www.usdoj.gov/pardon/forms/state_
survey.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2006).
20. Angela Behrens, Christopher Uggens & Jeff Manza, Ballot Manipulation
and the “Menace of Negro Domination”: Racial Threat and Felon
Disenfranchisement in the United States, 1850-2002, 109 AM. J. SOC. 559, 563–67
(2003).
21. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1218 n.5 (11th Cir. 2005).
22. See FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 2, pt. II. Restoration of civil rights,
including the franchise, is possible in some states upon pardon of the offense. See
id.
23. For example, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia generally
restore voting rights upon the completion of sentence. See Parkes, supra note 10,
at 73.
24. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 75–76 n.24 (1964) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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been convicted of a felony involving moral turpitude unless his civil
rights have been restored.”25 The provision was adopted at
Alaska’s constitutional convention in 1956 and became law upon
26
Congress approved
Alaska’s admission to the union in 1959.
Alaska’s constitution, including the felon disenfranchisement
27
provision, when it granted statehood. The language mirrored that
28
of contemporary provisions in other states’ constitutions.
The contours of the constitutional provision are set by statute.
The term “felony involving moral turpitude” is defined to include
29
nearly all felonies. Voting registration is automatically cancelled
30
upon conviction. Voting rights are restored, and felons may reregister to vote upon completion of their sentences including any
31
Felon disenfranchisement in
terms of parole or probation.
Alaska, which is more lenient than the lifetime ban imposed in

25. ALASKA CONST. art. V, § 2.
26. GORDON HARRISON, ALASKA’S CONSTITUTION: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE, 3 (4th
ed. 2003), available at http://w3.legis.state.ak.us/infodocs/constitution/citizens_
guide.pdf [hereinafter CITIZEN’S GUIDE].
27. See id. at 3–4.
28. GERALD A. MCBEATH, THE ALASKA STATE CONSTITUTION: A
REFERENCE GUIDE 125 (1997). The voting qualifications in Alaska’s original
constitution included a literacy test. CITIZEN’S GUIDE, supra note 26, at 105.
29. ALASKA STAT. § 15.60.010(8) (2006). At present, crimes meriting
disenfranchisement (“felon[ies] involving moral turpitude”) include:
those crimes that are immoral or wrong in themselves such as murder,
manslaughter, assault, sexual assault, sexual abuse of a minor, unlawful
exploitation of a minor, robbery, extortion, coercion, kidnapping, incest,
arson, burglary, theft, forgery, criminal possession of a forgery device,
offering a false instrument for recording, scheme to defraud, falsifying
business records, commercial bribe receiving, commercial bribery,
bribery, receiving a bribe, perjury, perjury by inconsistent statements,
endangering the welfare of a minor, escape, promoting contraband,
interference with official proceedings, receiving a bribe by a witness or a
juror, jury tampering, misconduct by a juror, tampering with physical
evidence, hindering prosecution, terroristic threatening, riot, criminal
possession of explosives, unlawful furnishing of explosives, promoting
prostitution, criminal mischief, misconduct involving a controlled
substance or an imitation controlled substance, permitting an escape,
promoting gambling, possession of gambling records, distribution of
child pornography, and possession of child pornography . . . .
Id.
30. ALASKA STAT. § 15.07.135.
31. ALASKA STAT. § 15.05.030 (“Upon the unconditional discharge, the person
may register under AS 15.07.”). “Unconditional discharge” occurs when “a
person is released from all disability arising under a conviction and sentence,
including probation and parole.” ALASKA STAT. § 15.60.010(38).
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some states, is in line with the policies of a majority of other
states.32
B. Felon Disenfranchisement and Race
Though facially race-neutral, felon disenfranchisement laws
were, historically, enacted with a discriminatory purpose. Authors
have noted that many states enacted such laws in the aftermath of
the Civil War as part of a larger defensive response to the
Reconstruction Amendments’ extension of the franchise to
33
African-Americans. This response included poll taxes, literacy
tests, and other Jim Crow measures to suppress the voting power of
34
For
example,
a
1901
felon
African-Americans.
disenfranchisement provision to Alabama’s state constitution was
expressly intended to single out only those felonies believed to be
35
more frequently committed by African-Americans. In 1985, the
Supreme Court struck down that provision in the case of Hunter v.
36
Underwood.
To the extent felon disenfranchisement laws were tailored to
maximize a racially disparate impact, they have enjoyed
37
considerable success. Nationally, an estimated thirteen percent of
African-American men are disenfranchised, with as many as thirtyone percent of African-American men in two states—Alabama and
38
Following a review of
Florida—permanently disenfranchised.
voting in the United States, the National Commission on Federal
Election Reform, chaired by former presidents Jimmy Carter and
Gerald Ford, urged states to scale back felon disenfranchisement
laws, citing that as many as one in six African-Americans were
39
disenfranchised in many states. Even where discriminatory intent

32. See FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 2, pt. III.
33. Behrens et al., supra note 20, at 563 (analyzing post-Civil War responses to
extending the franchise to African-Americans and drawing on social science
theories of race competition and criminal justice).
34. Id.
35. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228–29 (1985). The Alabama statute
at issue was not discriminatory on its face, but the Court nevertheless struck it
down on the basis of discriminatory intent evidenced in the legislative history. See
id. at 227–32; Underwood v. Hunter, 730 F.2d 614, 618–20 (11th Cir. 1984).
36. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. at 232–33.
37. See FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 2, pt. II (setting out the racially
disproportionate impact of felon disenfranchisement laws).
38. Id. pt III.
39. THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM, TO ASSURE
PRIDE AND CONFIDENCE IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 51 (August 2001), available
at http://millercenter.virginia.edu/programs/natl_commissions/final_report.html.
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has not been proven, discriminatory effect continues to be the
reality.40
Alaska’s experience is comparable. Although comprehensive
studies of racial disparity in felon disenfranchisement in Alaska are
41
unavailable, incarceration statistics provide a useful proxy.
Alaska’s largest minority group, Alaska Natives, comprise
42
approximately sixteen percent of the state’s general population,
43
but they account for thirty-seven percent of its prison population.
Similar disparity exists in the cases of other minorities, including
African-Americans, who account for over ten percent of the prison
44
population while representing less than four percent of the
45
general population. It has been suggested that cultural factors
may make Alaska Natives more susceptible to felon
46
disenfranchisement. The precise mechanism by which racial bias
in the criminal justice system may result in disproportionate
disenfranchisement, and indeed whether racial bias is the cause of
the disparity, is unclear and would require further study.
C. Constitutionality of Alaska’s Felon Disenfranchisement Law
Felon disenfranchisement laws come under constitutional
scrutiny in two ways. First, as a restriction on voting, the laws
interfere with a fundamental right and implicate the Equal
40. In Florida, the Eleventh Circuit denied an equal protection challenge to
the state’s felon disenfranchisement laws for lack of demonstrated racially
discriminatory intent, Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1223 (11th Cir.
2005), even though nearly one in three African-American men in Florida is
permanently disenfranchised, see FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 2, pt. III.
41. Incarceration rates are, at best, an imprecise proxy for felon
disenfranchisement. They are over-inclusive in that they include those inmates
who are ineligible to vote, as well as those incarcerated for misdemeanors, and
they are under-inclusive in that they do not include parolees or Alaska felons
incarcerated outside of the state who are also unable to vote.
42. U.S. Census, supra note 4.
43. ALASKA OFFENDER PROFILE, supra note 4.
44. Id.
45. U.S. Census, supra note 4.
46. See, e.g., Dave Stephenson, For Alaska Natives: Extermination by
Incarceration?, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, June 26, 2003, available at
http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id=1056628610
(advancing
the
argument that Alaska Natives may be more likely to confess to a crime upon
arrest than are white arrestees, thereby reducing the likelihood of a plea
agreement for a lesser charge or sentence). If true, such factors might make
felony—as opposed to misdemeanor—conviction more likely, leading to longer
incarceration periods and thereby exacerbating the impact of felon
disenfranchisement.
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Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Second,
because the laws affect the voting rights of racial minorities, they
also implicate the Fifteenth Amendment’s prohibition on
47
Supreme Court
disenfranchisement “on account of race.”
decisions addressing both theories have concluded that felon
disenfranchisement laws are constitutional unless it can be proved
48
they were enacted with racially discriminatory intent.
Ordinarily, a state law affecting a fundamental right, such as
49
voting, would be subject to strict scrutiny. However, in the 1974
case of Richardson v. Ramirez, the Supreme Court held that felon
disenfranchisement laws are not subject to heightened scrutiny
under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment because Section 2
of that Amendment includes an “affirmative sanction” of such
50
laws. Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which reduces a
state’s representation in Congress in proportion to its
disenfranchisement of otherwise qualified voters, provides an
exception for disenfranchisement based on “participation in
51
rebellion, or other crime.” Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a
divided court, reasoned that “those who framed and adopted the
Fourteenth Amendment could not have intended to prohibit
outright in § 1 of that Amendment that which was expressly
exempted from the lesser sanction of reduced representation
52
imposed by § 2 of the Amendment.” Put another way, the voting

47. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
48. The Court has also heard and rejected Eighth Amendment challenges to
felon disenfranchisement. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96–97 (1958) (felon
disenfranchisement is not punitive and merely designates a grounds for voting
eligibility). For an in-depth treatment of felon disenfranchisement as punishment
in the context of the Eighth Amendment, see Pamela A. Wilkins, The Mark of
Cain: Disenfranchised Felons and the Constitutional No Man’s Land, 56 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 85 (2005).
49. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627–28 (1969)
(applying strict scrutiny to voting restrictions); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
561–62 (1964) (“Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter. . . .”);
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (“[T]he political franchise . . . is
regarded as a fundamental political right . . . .”).
50. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974).
51. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. The Amendment provides in pertinent part
that “when the right to vote at any election . . . is denied . . . or in any way
abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of
representation [in Congress] shall be reduced . . . .” Id. (emphasis added).
52. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 43.
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rights of felons are not protected as “fundamental” under the
Equal Protection Clause.53
Nevertheless,
even
if
Richardson
shields
felon
disenfranchisement laws from strict scrutiny under the Equal
54
Protection Clause, Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment still
operates independently to prevent purposeful racial discrimination.
55
In Hunter v. Underwood, the Supreme Court struck down a
provision in Alabama’s constitution disenfranchising those
56
The provision was
convicted of certain enumerated felonies.
enacted in 1901 with the purpose of disenfranchising on the basis of
race and applied only to felonies believed committed more
57
Chief Justice Rehnquist,
frequently by African-Americans.
writing for the Court as he did in Richardson, explained that
“[w]ithout again considering the implicit authorization of [felon
disenfranchisement under § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment], we
are confident that § 2 was not designed to permit the purposeful

53. At least one circuit has framed the law in this way. See Owens v. Barnes,
711 F.2d 25, 27 (3d Cir. 1983).
54. Richardson’s reading of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment has been
widely criticized. See, e.g., Carlos M. Portugal, Democracy Frozen in Devonian
Amber: The Racial Impact of Permanent Felon Disenfranchisement in Florida, 57
U. MIAMI L. REV. 1317, 1325–26 (2003); John Hart Ely, Interclausal Immunity, 87
VA. L. REV. 1185, 1195 (2001). Dissenting, Justice Marshall argued in Richardson
that Section 2 merely established a system of punitive reduction in representation
for disenfranchisement as a compromise because wholesale enfranchisement of
African-Americans would have been unpalatable and, therefore, that the scope of
the language of Section 2 is limited to the operation of its punitive sanction and
not to the entirety of the Fourteenth Amendment. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 73–74
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
For an argument that the Fifteenth Amendment effectively repealed Section
2 of the Fourteenth Amendment and, therefore, that the latter cannot shield felon
disenfranchisement laws from equal protection scrutiny, see Gabriel J. Chin,
Reconstruction, Felon Disenfranchisement, and the Right to Vote: Did the Fifteenth
Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. L.J. 259
(2004).
Richardson preempts the question of whether, without a Section 2 shield,
felon disenfranchisement would survive strict scrutiny. For an argument that
felon disenfranchisement fails strict scrutiny because it is over-inclusive and only
tenuously related to the most commonly cited state interests, see Angela Behrens,
Note, Voting—Not Quite a Fundamental Right? A Look at Legal and Legislative
Challenges to Felon Disenfranchisement Laws, 98 MINN. L. REV. 231, 259–72
(2004).
55. 471 U.S. 222, 232 (1985).
56. Id. at 232.
57. Id. at 227–28; see discussion supra note 35.
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racial discrimination attending the enactment and operation of [a
law] which otherwise violates § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”58
Independently of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifteenth
Amendment prohibits the denial of the right to vote “on account of
59
race.” The Supreme Court has construed this prohibition to apply
60
only to intentional discrimination. In City of Mobile v. Bolden,
the Supreme Court held that “action by a State that is racially
neutral on its face violates the Fifteenth Amendment only if
61
motivated by a discriminatory purpose.”
Alaska’s felon disenfranchisement laws are facially neutral and
would, therefore, be unconstitutional only if enacted with a
discriminatory purpose. Because the laws do not appear to have
62
been adopted with racially discriminatory intent, they are subject
63
to legal challenge, if at all, only under federal legislation.
III. THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965
A. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the 1982 Amendments
Though the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified in 1870, it took
nearly one hundred years before Congress systematically addressed
64
disenfranchisement of racial minorities. The Voting Rights Act of
65
1965 was enacted by Congress to “banish the blight of racial
discrimination in voting, which has infected the electoral process in
66
Congress was
parts of our country for nearly a century.”
prompted to act after case-by-case litigation under previous
legislation, including the Civil Rights Act of 1957, failed to

58. Id. at 233.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
60. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980).
61. Id.
62. This Note assumes, for the purpose of analysis, that discriminatory intent
did not drive enactment of Alaska’s felon disenfranchisement laws—or, at the
very least, that discriminatory purpose likely could not be proven in the context of
a constitutional challenge.
63. Of course, less countermajoritarian methods of legal reform remain
available to Alaskans, such as constitutional amendment and the state legislative
process.
64. Portugal, supra note 54, at 1328.
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971–1973 (2000), as amended in 1970, Pub. L. 91-285, 84
Stat. 314 (1970), and in 1982, Pub. L. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982). The VRA has
been reauthorized and amended by Congress on several occasions, including in
1970, 1975, and 1982, and was reauthorized by the President in July 2006. Bush
Signs Extension of Voting Rights Act, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2006, at A22.
66. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966).
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adequately prevent disenfranchisement on account of race.67 The
VRA imposed bold measures, including section 5, which prohibited
the use of discriminatory tests or devices, such as literacy tests, and
required that any state making use of such devices would thereafter
have to apply for pre-clearance from the U.S. Attorney General or
a federal circuit judge in Washington, D.C. for any future changes
68
to voting laws. At the time of the VRA’s enactment, Alaska
employed a literacy test and was, therefore, designated a “covered
69
jurisdiction” for these purposes. Federal supervision of the voting
laws of “covered jurisdictions,” most of which are in the South,
70
continues today.
In 1966, the Supreme Court upheld the VRA as a valid
exercise of Congress’s enforcement powers under Section 2 of the
71
Fifteenth Amendment. In 1980, however, the Court narrowed the
72
effect of the VRA in City of Mobile v. Bolden. There, the Court
73
held that section 2 of the VRA had “an effect no different from
that of the Fifteenth Amendment itself” and that a voting
qualification law would only be struck down under the Act if it
were proved that the law was enacted with a racially discriminatory
74
purpose. In so doing, the Court overruled the then-applicable
75
“effects test” for voting qualifications.
In 1982, Congress responded to City of Mobile by adding a
76
“totality of the circumstances” test to section 2 of the VRA.
67. Id. at 313.
68. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 89 Pub. L. 110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965).
69. See Laughlin McDonald, The Voting Rights Act in Indian Country: South
Dakota, A Case Study, 29 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 43, 45–46 (2004); CITIZEN’S GUIDE,
supra note 26, at 107.
70. Congressional representatives from southern states covered by the VRA’s
section 5 pre-clearance provisions sought to remove those provisions during the
reauthorization of the VRA in 2006. See Raymond Hernandez, After Challenges,
House Approves Renewal of Voting Act, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2006, at A13.
71. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 337.
72. 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (plurality opinion).
73. The original text of the section read, “No voting qualification or
prerequisites to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or
applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.” Voting Rights
Act of 1965, 89 Pub. L. 11, 79 Stat. 437 (1965).
74. City of Mobile, 446 U.S. at 61–62.
75. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 769 (1973) (totality of the
circumstances test applied to vote dilution case brought under section 2 of the
VRA).
76. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43 (1986). The amended section 2
provides, in pertinent part:
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Under the amended VRA, “plaintiffs [can] prevail by showing that,
under the totality of the circumstances, a challenged election law or
procedure [has] the effect of denying a protected minority an equal
77
chance to participate in the electoral process.” As the Court later
explained, “[t]he essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral
law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical
78
conditions” to cause unequal voting power.
B. Applicability of the VRA to Felon Disenfranchisement Laws
Since the 1982 amendments to the VRA, several plaintiffs
have sought to use it to invalidate felon disenfranchisement laws on
79
the basis of their racially disproportionate effects. Circuits have
split over whether the VRA does, in fact, apply to felon
disenfranchisement laws. The Second Circuit in Hayden v. Pataki
and the Tenth Circuit in Johnson v. Governor of Florida both held
80
In
the VRA inapplicable to felon disenfranchisement laws.
81
contrast, in Farrakhan v. Washington, the Ninth Circuit held that
“[f]elon disenfranchisement is a voting qualification, and Section 2
is clear that any voting qualification that denies citizens the right to
82
vote in a discriminatory manner violates the VRA.” Therefore, a
claim against Alaska’s felon disenfranchisement laws would be

(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice,
or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political
subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or
color . . . .
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on
the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that . . . members of
[protected racial minorities] have less opportunity than other members
of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice.
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000) (emphasis added).
77. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44 n.8.
78. Id. at 47.
79. Id.; see, e.g., Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2006); Johnson v.
Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005).
80. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 310; see Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1234.
81. Farrakhan v. Washington (Farrakhan I), 338 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir.
2003).
82. Id. The Sixth Circuit also considered a VRA challenge to Tennessee’s
felon disenfranchisement law in Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255 (2d Cir. 1986).
The court did not directly consider whether the VRA applies to felon
disenfranchisement but appears to have assumed that it did. See id. at 1262
(affirming dismissal of the VRA claim on summary judgment).
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“cognizable under Section 2 of the VRA” under Ninth Circuit
precedent.83
The Second and Tenth Circuit opinions concluding that the
VRA does not apply to felon disenfranchisement laws rely on three
arguments: (1) that the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes felon
disenfranchisement laws (the “affirmative sanction” argument); (2)
that application of the VRA to felon disenfranchisement would be
an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s enforcement power; and
(3) that canons of statutory construction support construing the
VRA not to apply to felon disenfranchisement laws. The relative
merits of each argument are assessed in turn.
1. The “Affirmative Sanction” Argument. As discussed
previously, the Richardson case established that felon
disenfranchisement laws enacted without racially discriminatory
84
intent do not violate the Equal Protection Clause. This is because
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment’s enforcement
mechanism—that a state’s representation in Congress will be
reduced in proportion to the disenfranchisement of otherwise
qualified
voters—carries
an
express
exception
for
disenfranchisement based on “participation in rebellion, or other
85
crime.”
The Eleventh Circuit, in Johnson, seized on language in
Richardson describing Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment as
an “affirmative sanction” of felon disenfranchisement and cited it
for the proposition that states have discretion to deny the vote to
86
convicted felons. The court argued that applying the VRA to
Florida’s felon disenfranchisement law would allow “a
87
congressional statute to override the text of the Constitution.”
More recently, the Second Circuit, in Hayden, cited Section 2 of
the Fourteenth Amendment as the “starting point” in the analysis
of the VRA’s applicability to New York’s felon disenfranchisement
88
The Second Circuit, while noting that felon
law.

83. Farrakhan I, 338 F.3d at 1016.
84. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54–55 (1974); supra notes 50–58
and accompanying text.
85. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
86. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1228–29 (11th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54).
87. Id. at 1229.
88. Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 316 (2d Cir. 2006); accord Muntaqim v.
Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 122 (2d Cir. 2004). Hayden is the en banc rehearing of the
Muntaqim decision, which is incorporated by reference. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 313–
14.
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disenfranchisement provisions are not entirely immune from
constitutional or congressional scrutiny, found that the Fourteenth
89
Amendment provided “explicit approval” of those types of laws.
Dissenting from the Ninth Circuit’s denial of an en banc rehearing
of the Farrakhan case, Judge Alex Kozinski argued that felon
disenfranchisement laws were presumptively valid due to the
90
Fourteenth Amendment’s textual endorsement of such laws.
Interestingly, neither the Second Circuit nor Judge Kozinski
addressed the fact that the VRA was enacted to enforce the
Fifteenth Amendment, not the Fourteenth. The Eleventh Circuit
91
The distinction is,
brushed off the distinction in a footnote.
however, the key weakness to the “affirmative sanction” argument
because the Fifteenth Amendment grants its own protections that
are not hindered by purported limitations to the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Judge Barrington Daniels Parker, Jr. of the Second Circuit
made this point in his dissent in Hayden. Pointing out that
Richardson’s “affirmative sanction” came in the context of a claim
that felon disenfranchisement was a per se violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Judge Parker noted that “Richardson did
not grant felon disenfranchisement immunity against any other
92
ground of invalidity. . . .” As a textual matter, Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment at most “declines to prohibit” felon
disenfranchisement and does not affirmatively immunize the
93
practice relative to other constitutional protections. As Judge
Parker reasoned:
The Constitution does not endorse felon disenfranchisement
when it declines to prohibit the practice, any more than the
Constitution endorses felon enslavement when the Thirteenth
Amendment states: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States . . . .”
94
Declining to prohibit something is not the same as protecting it.

Nor does Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment require
states to disenfranchise felons. If states can choose not to
disenfranchise felons without running afoul of the Fourteenth
Amendment, then Congress, acting pursuant to its power to

89. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 316.
90. Farrakhan v. Washington (Farrakhan II), 359 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir.
2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
91. Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1228–29 n.29.
92. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 349 (Parker, J., dissenting).
93. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
94. Id. (citation omitted).
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enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, can compel the same result.
Indeed, the “affirmative sanction” argument is more of a rhetorical
device than an independent constitutional limitation on the VRA.
2. Arguments on the Constitutionality of the VRA as
Enforcement Legislation.
Enforcement legislation under the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments is valid only to the extent
95
that it remedies or prevents actual constitutional violations. The
Eleventh Circuit, Chief Judge John M. Walker, Jr.’s concurrence to
the Second Circuit’s Hayden opinion, and Judge Kozinski’s dissent
in the Ninth Circuit have all argued that the VRA would be
96
unconstitutional as applied to felon disenfranchisement laws.
The enforcement power is limited by two independent
requirements. The first is that enforcement legislation must be
97
supported by a history of constitutional violations. The second is
that the measures must be narrowly tailored to the constitutional ill
98
sought to be avoided. In his Hayden concurrence, Chief Judge
Walker found no congressional record establishing that felon
disenfranchisement laws have been used to discriminate against
99
In Johnson, the petitioners had argued that
minority voters.
specific examples of violations should not be required because
Congress could not envision every possible means of racial
100
The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument,
discrimination.
citing the widespread use of felon disenfranchisement laws at the
101
Lastly, Judge Kozinski
time that the VRA was enacted.
emphasized in his dissent from the Ninth Circuit’s denial of a
rehearing in Farrakhan that “[t]he theoretical, undocumented
threat of unconstitutional felon disenfranchisement laws simply
102
doesn’t justify” application of section 2 to those state laws.

95. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
96. See Hayden, 449 F.3d at 330 (Walker, C.J., concurring); Johnson, 405 F.3d
at 1231–32; Farrakhan v. Washington (Farrakhan II), 359 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir.
2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
97. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001); Kimel
v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,
130 (1970) (holding the amendment to VRA lowering the voting age to eighteen
invalid because Congress made no findings that an age limit of twenty-one was
used to discriminate on race).
98. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
99. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 330–31 (Walker, C.J., concurring).
100. Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1231 n.33.
101. Id.
102. Farrakhan v. Washington (Farrakhan II), 359 F.3d 1116, 1123 (9th Cir.
2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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Lack of congressional findings of a pattern of historical
discrimination through felon disenfranchisement laws103 informs the
analysis of the proportionality and congruence of the purported
remedial measure at issue. Although the Supreme Court has
repeatedly emphasized the importance that enforcement legislation
104
be geographically targeted, the VRA applies to all states
105
regardless of their individual histories. To the extent the VRA is
either inadequately supported by findings of a pattern of
discrimination or not narrowly tailored, application of the VRA to
felon disenfranchisement would be unconstitutional.
The Ninth Circuit did not consider this issue in Farrakhan
when it allowed a VRA challenge to Washington’s felon
106
On remand, the Farrakhan
disenfranchisement law to proceed.
case was dismissed on summary judgment, mooting for now the
question of constitutionality of the VRA as applied to felon
107
disenfranchisement laws. Indeed, the narrow issue of as-applied
constitutionality of the VRA as enforcement legislation relative to
felon disenfranchisement laws would not be ripe until such a law is
actually invalidated. Rather, the constitutional doubt associated
with application of the VRA to felon disenfranchisement serves
primarily as a predicate for the statutory construction arguments
discussed next.
3. Statutory Interpretation Arguments. The Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation of the VRA was the same as that pointedly
expressed in a dissent by Judge Sonia Sotomayor of the Second
Circuit: “[i]t is plain to anyone reading the Voting Rights Act that
108
The majority in the
it applies to all ‘voting qualification[s].’”
103. This is not to say that there is not an actual record of state use of felon
disenfranchisement laws to discriminate on race. That states used felon
disenfranchisement laws in order to discriminate is well documented. See supra
notes 33-37 and accompanying text. Rather, that history is not part of the
congressional findings made at the time of the enactment of the VRA and its
relevant amendments. See Hayden, 449 F.3d at 330–31 (Walker, C.J., concurring).
104. Farrakhan II, 359 F.3d at 1124 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (noting that a
purported enforcement legislation was not geographically targeted and was
therefore struck down in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)).
105. Geographic targetedness is particularly relevant to the present analysis of
Alaska and is addressed in Part IV.
106. See Farrakhan v. Washington (Farrakhan I), 338 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir.
2003).
107. See Farrakhan v. Gregoire (Farrakhan III), No. CV-96-076-RHW, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45987, at *2 (E.D. Wash. July 7, 2006).
108. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 367–68 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (second alteration
in original); Farrakhan I, 338 F.3d at 1016.
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Second Circuit, though admitting that “[t]here is no question that
the language of [section 2] is extremely broad . . . and could be read
to include felon disenfranchisement provisions,” nevertheless
stressed the importance of interpretation in light of congressional
intent, cryptically citing dated authority for the proposition that
“[t]he circumstances of the enactment of particular legislation may
persuade a court that Congress did not intend the words of
109
common meaning to have their literal effect.”
Two canons of construction have been deployed to interpret
the VRA away from felon disenfranchisement provisions: the
avoidance canon and the clear statement rule. The Eleventh
Circuit relied upon the avoidance canon, which counsels that, in
the case of an ambiguous statute, “where an otherwise acceptable
construction of a statue would raise serious constitutional
problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such
problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent
110
of Congress.”
The Second Circuit—both sitting en banc in Hayden and
through the three-judge panel that decided Muntaqim v. Coombe,
the predecessor to Hayden—distanced itself from the Eleventh
111
Circuit’s reliance on the avoidance canon. The reason expressed
in Muntaqim is that the clarity of the text of section 2 of the VRA
is impossible to reconcile with the avoidance canon’s ambiguity
112
requirement. Indeed, a concurring judge on the Eleventh Circuit
conceded that the majority “overstates the case for constitutional
avoidance” because “[a]s a purely textual matter, a voting

109. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 315 (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266
(1981)).
110. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 575 (1988).
111. See 366 F.3d 102, 128 n.22 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[Section 2], while vague, does
not seem ambiguous.”), aff’d en banc, Hayden, 449 F.3d 305. The Hayden court
barely mentioned the avoidance canon and made only passing reference to the
Eleventh Circuit’s reliance on it. 449 F.3d at 313, 328 n.24.
112. See Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 128 n.22. The Johnson court, ironically, turned
to the Muntaqim decision for the proposition that section 2 is ambiguous, citing
that court’s assessment that the meaning of section 2 is “exceedingly difficult to
discern.” Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1229 n.30 (11th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 116). In the quoted passage, however, the
Muntaqim court referred to ambiguity in the degree of intent required to establish
a violation of section 2, not the scope of the Act’s coverage relative to felon
disenfranchisement laws. Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1229 n.30; Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at
116–18.
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qualification based on felony status . . . falls within the scope of the
VRA.”113
A stronger statutory construction argument, and the one
adopted by the majority in Hayden, is premised on the so-called
clear statement rule. The rule provides that “if Congress intends to
alter the ‘usual constitutional balance between the States and the
Federal Government,’ it must make its intention to do so
114
‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.’” The Hayden
court held that the clear statement rule does not require ambiguity
but only a lack of a clear statement, explaining that “we will apply
the clear statement rule when a statute admits of an interpretation
that would alter the federal balance but there is reason to
believe . . . that Congress may not have intended such an alteration
115
of the federal balance.” The rule is intended to prevent a statute
from inadvertently affecting the federal-state balance of power.
The Supreme Court has held, in another context, that “clear
statement rules ensure Congress does not, by broad or general
language, legislate on a sensitive topic inadvertently or without due
116
Given that sweeping language alone may not
deliberation.”
satisfy the clear statement rule, the question becomes one of
congressional intent.
Considerable evidence suggests that Congress did not intend
117
For
the VRA to apply to felon disenfranchisement laws.
example, though Congress expressly identified common forms of
discriminatory voter qualifications, including literacy, educational,
and moral character tests, it never mentioned felon
118
disenfranchisement in the text of the VRA. In fact, as noted by
the Hayden court, the only reference to felon disenfranchisement
in the legislative history of the VRA was to clarify that the VRA’s
character test provisions “would not result in the proscription of
the frequent requirement of States and political subdivisions that
an applicant for voting or registration for voting be free of
119
conviction of a felony or mental disability.” Indeed, the Hayden

113. Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1239–40 (Wilson, J., concurring in part).
114. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991) (quoting Will v. Mich.,
491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (internal citation omitted)).
115. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 325.
116. Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line, Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 139 (2005)
(addressing a presumption against applying statutes to the internal affairs of
foreign vessels).
117. See, e.g., Hayden, 449 F.3d at 315.
118. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(c) (2000).
119. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 318 (quoting S. Rep. No. 89-162, at 24 (1965),
reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2508, 2562); see also H.R. Rep. No. 89-439, at 19
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court reasoned that, given the prevalence of felon
disenfranchisement statutes, “it seems unfathomable that Congress
would silently amend the Voting Rights Act in a way that would
120
affect them.”
Whether application of the VRA to felon disenfranchisement
laws would upset the federal-state balance is in dispute. In
Muntaqim, the Second Circuit held that the federal-state balance
would be upset because applying the VRA to felon
disenfranchisement laws would exceed Congress’s enforcement
121
power and contradict Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Eleventh Circuit in Johnson concurred generally with that
122
conclusion but did not rely on it. On a rehearing of Muntaqim in
Hayden, the Second Circuit hewed its analysis more directly to
“three important state interests” that would be affected by
applying the VRA to New York’s felon disenfranchisement law:
“(1) the regulation of the franchise; (2) the State’s authority to
craft its criminal law; and (3) the regulation of correctional
123
institutions.”
Rejecting the federalism concerns similarly raised by the
Tenth Circuit in Johnson, Judge Rosemary Barkett in dissent
reasoned that federalism is not implicated by the VRA because the
“Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments altered the constitutional
balance between the two sovereigns—not the Voting Rights Act,
124
which merely enforces the guarantees of those amendments.”
125
This argument was repeated in Judge Parker’s Hayden dissent.

(1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2457. Nor did the 1982 amendments
expand the scope of the VRA. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 383–84 (1991)
(“[T]he coverage provided by the 1982 amendment is coextensive with the
coverage provided by the Act prior to 1982.”). The 1982 amendments merely
lowered the evidentiary burden to establish a violation by replacing an “intent”
test with an “effects” test. Id. at 403–04.
120. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 317 (quoting Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d
1214, 1234 (11th Cir. 2005)).
121. See Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 126 (2d Cir. 2004). Both
arguments against applying the VRA to felon disenfranchisement discussed serve
as predicates for application of the clear statement rule because they implicate
federalism.
122. The court makes passing reference to the clear statement rule in a
footnote. See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1232 n.35.
123. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 326.
124. Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1250 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (citing a dissent from an
equally divided court in the Second Circuit’s first consideration of the question in
Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919, 938 (2d Cir. 1996) (Feinberg, J., dissenting)).
125. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 358.
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Whatever the uncertainties of the basis for these divergent
circuit decisions, Ninth Circuit law is, for now, clear that a
challenge to Alaska’s felon disenfranchisement law is possible
under section 2 of the VRA.
IV. ALASKA’S FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAW AND THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965
A. Ninth Circuit’s Framework for Challenges Under Section 2 of
the VRA
Nearly a decade before Farrakhan, the Ninth Circuit set a
framework for challenges under section 2 of the VRA in Smith v.
126
Salt River involved an Arizona agricultural district
Salt River.
power board election rule that limited voting to landowners within
127
the district. African-American plaintiffs claimed that the voting
qualification combined with racial disparities in land ownership
rates had a racially disproportionate effect on voting rights in
128
violation of section 2 of the VRA.
The Salt River court affirmed that section 2 of the VRA
“prohibits voting qualifications which result in discrimination on
account of race or color . . . [and] requires proof only of a
129
discriminatory result, not of discriminatory intent.” Further, the
intent is judged under the “totality of the circumstances” test with
reference to several non-exclusive, so-called Senate Factors
130
identified in the legislative history of the VRA.

126. Smith v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 109 F.3d
586 (9th Cir. 1997).
127. Id. at 589.
128. Id. at 588.
129. Id. at 594 (citing Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 394 (1991)).
130. Id. at 594 n.6. The Senate Factors are:
(1) the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or
political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the
minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the
democratic process[;]
(2) the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political
subdivision is racially polarized;
(3) the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used
unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single
shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may
enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group;
(4) if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the
minority group have been denied access to that process;
(5) the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or
political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as
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Significantly, in interpreting the “totality of the circumstances”
test under the VRA, the Salt River court held that “a bare
statistical showing of disproportionate impact on a racial minority
does not satisfy the § 2 ‘results’ inquiry. Instead, ‘section 2
plaintiffs must show a causal connection between the challenged
131
voting practice and [a] prohibited discriminatory result.’”
As the Ninth Circuit explained, “[t]he real question this case
presents is whether the land ownership requirement denies
132
African-Americans the right and opportunity to vote . . . .”
Affirming the district court’s dismissal for lack of a “causal
connection,” the Ninth Circuit, relying heavily on a stipulated lack
of historical racial discrimination, concluded that “the statistical
disparity in African-American and white home ownership does not
133
prove the District has violated § 2.”
B. Applying the VRA in Farrakhan
In late 2000, the Eastern District of Washington dismissed for
the first time a claim by Muhammad Shabazz Farrakhan and others
that Washington’s felon disenfranchisement law violated section 2
134
The court held that “although the
of the VRA.
disenfranchisement provision clearly has a disproportionate impact
on racial minorities, there is no evidence that the provision’s
enactment was motivated by racial animus, or that its operation by

education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to
participate effectively in the political process;
(6) whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or
subtle racial appeals;
(7) the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected
to public office in the jurisdiction;
Additional factors . . . are:
whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of
elected officials to the particularized need of the members of the
minority group; [and] whether the policy underlying the state or political
subdivision’s use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice, or procedure is tenuous.
Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 28–29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177,
206–07).
131. Id. at 595 (alteration in original) (quoting Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia
Office of the City Comm’rs Voter Registration Div., 28 F.3d 306, 312 (9th Cir.
1997)).
132. Id. at 596.
133. Id.
134. Farrakhan v. Locke, No. CS-96-76-RHW, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22212, at
*18 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2000), rev’d in part sub nom., Farrakhan v. Washington
(Farrakhan I), 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003).
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itself has a discriminatory effect.”135 The court referenced the
136
Senate Factors but declined to apply them directly. Instead, the
court reasoned that, factoring out racial discrimination in the
criminal justice system, it was impossible to show a discriminatory
137
effect from the disenfranchisement provision.
The Ninth Circuit rejected the district court’s reasoning and
held that section 2 of the VRA required more than an isolated
inquiry into the challenged voting qualification without reference
138
to external factors. Instead, the court emphasized that section 2’s
“totality of the circumstances” test “requires courts to consider
how a challenged voting practice interacts with external factors such
as ‘social and historical conditions’ to result in denial of the right to
139
vote on account of race or color.” Holding that an inquiry into a
“causal connection” between racial discrimination and denial of
voting rights involves reference to the relevant Senate Factors, the
court specifically noted that “racial bias in the criminal justice
140
system” is relevant and encompassed in the factors.
Having rejected the “by itself” causation standard applied by
the district court, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for an
evaluation of the external factors that may establish a causal
relationship between discrimination in the criminal justice system
141
The court
and the voting mechanism based on felony status.
explained that “a causal connection may be shown where the
discriminatory impact of a challenged voting practice is attributable
to racial discrimination in the surrounding social and historical
142
The court illustrated the test with reference to
circumstances.”
143
There, the challenge failed because the
the Salt River case.
external factor—a difference in land ownership rates—was not
144
“substantially explained by race.”
Captioned Farrakhan v. Gregoire on remand, the case was
heard a second time by Judge Robert Whaley of the Eastern

135. Locke, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22212, at *9–*10.
136. Id. at *9 n.4.
137. Id. at *10.
138. Farrakhan I, 338 F.3d at 1011–12.
139. Id. (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986)).
140. Id. at 1020.
141. Id. at 1019–20 (“[C]ourts must be able to consider whether voting
practices ‘accommodate or amplify the effect that . . . discrimination has on the
voting process.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Smith v. Salt River Project
Agric. Improvement and Power Dist., 109 F.3d 595 n.7 (9th Cir. 1997))).
142. Id. at 1019.
143. Id. (citing Salt River, 109 F.3d at 595).
144. Id. at 1017 (quoting Salt River, 109 F.3d at 591).

04__MURRAY.DOC

2006]

1/10/2007 8:48 AM

FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT

311

District of Washington.145 Reviewing statistical evidence of racial
discrimination in Washington’s criminal justice system, Judge
Whaley wrote that “the Court is compelled to find that there is
discrimination in Washington’s criminal justice system on account
of race . . . [and] this discrimination ‘clearly hinder[s] the ability of
racial minorities to participate effectively in the political
146
process . . . .’”
In spite of this finding, the court in Farrakhan III took the
“totality of the circumstances” test as an opportunity to balance
away intentional discrimination in the criminal justice system with
reference to historical and social factors indicating a lack of
discriminatory intent in Washington. Addressing the Senate
Factors, the court cited a range of historical and social conditions
such as: Washington’s support for racial minorities; a lack of
discriminatory intent in the enactment of the felon
disenfranchisement law; the long tradition of felon
disenfranchisement in the United States; and even the implicit
endorsement of felon disenfranchisement in Section 2 of the
147
Weighing the factors, the court
Fourteenth Amendment.
concluded that “the totality of the circumstances does not support
a finding that Washington’s felon disenfranchisement law results in
148
discrimination in its electoral process on account of race.”
C. Alaska’s Felon Disenfranchisement Law in Light of
Farrakhan III
The court in Farrakhan III found that Washington’s felon
disenfranchisement law did not violate section 2 of the VRA in
spite of “compelling” evidence of racial discrimination in the
149
criminal justice system. Despite the Ninth Circuit’s holding that a
violation depends on the interaction between a voting mechanism
and external factors, the court in Farrakhan III weighed
“Washington’s history, or lack thereof, of racial bias in its electoral
process” to find that the totality of the circumstances test does not
support a finding that Washington’s felon disenfranchisement law
150
violates the VRA.

145. Farrakhan v. Gregoire (Farrakhan III), No. CV-96-076-RHW, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 45987 (E.D. Wash. July 7, 2006).
146. Id. at *18 (quoting Farrakhan I, 338 F.3d at 1020) (evaluating evidence
under the summary judgment standard).
147. Id. at *23–*28.
148. Id. at *29.
149. Id. at *28.
150. Id. at *28–*29.
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Significantly, the court in Farrakhan III allowed historical
evidence to stand in for an analysis of the required causal
connection between discrimination and racially disproportionate
effects of a voting qualification. In Salt River, the disproportionate
land ownership rates were not the result of discrimination—they
151
In Farrakhan III,
were simply a statistical anomaly.
disproportionate felony conviction was more than a statistical
152
anomaly—it was evidence of racial discrimination. Nevertheless,
this causal nexus was deemed outweighed by other Senate Factors.
Indeed, applying a balancing test to the Senate Factors may
provide a back door for other arguments, such as the “affirmative
153
sanction argument,” which the Ninth Circuit has rejected.
In Alaska, the statistics demonstrate that felon
154
disenfranchisement has a racially disproportionate impact.
Compared with Washington, however, Alaska may not be able to
rely so heavily on evidence of a historical lack of racial bias to
defeat a challenge to its felon disenfranchisement law. One factor
sure to be considered by any court hearing a VRA challenge to
Alaska’s felon disenfranchisement law will be that Alaska was
designated a “covered jurisdiction” because of its use of a literacy
155
test at the time of the VRA’s enactment. Although Alaska was
able to demonstrate in 1966 that it had not made racially
156
discriminatory use of that test for the preceding five years, the
stigma of having been singled out under section 5 of the VRA
weighs in favor, perhaps, of additional scrutiny under section 2.
Nevertheless, the outcome of a challenge to Alaska’s felon
disenfranchisement law is certain to be, as it was in Salt River and
Farrakhan III, a fact-specific inquiry shaded by the trial court’s
view of the proper application of the totality of the circumstances
test.
V. CONCLUSION
Felon disenfranchisement in Alaska will continue to be cause
for concern as long as it works a racially disproportionate effect.
Though recent decisions in the Tenth and Second Circuits have
151. Smith v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 109 F.3d
586, 596 (9th Cir. 1997).
152. Farrakhan III, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45987 at *28.
153. See Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1261 (6th Cir. 1986) (considering the
Fourteenth Amendment as a factor in the totality of the circumstances test).
154. See discussion supra Part II.B.
155. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
156. CITIZEN’S GUIDE, supra note 26, at 107 (noting that literacy tests in Alaska
“lingered under a cloud of suspicion”).
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rejected claims against state felon disenfranchisement laws brought
under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Ninth Circuit
has expressly held that such challenges can proceed. One such
claim, in the State of Washington, was ultimately unsuccessful.
Nevertheless, a case brought in Alaska, on different facts and
before a different court, may well invalidate the state’s practice of
disenfranchising felons on the basis of its racially disproportionate
impact.

